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Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of reimbursement regulation on launch times in the 
adoption of new medicines in a sample of OECD countries and a subsample of 
European countries. The latter also allows examination of price spillover effects, 
given that pharmaceutical product reimbursement regulation commonly benchmarks 
from prices in other countries. We empirically focus on the relative delays imposed 
by regulation on the adoption of a global set of molecules, which have diffused across 
more than 10 markets in the OECD over the period 1999-2008, controlling for various 
confounding effects. Through examining time to launch across a number of markets, 
and controlling for a number of confounding influences, we find that price and 
reimbursement regulations appear to delay the adoption of new pharmaceutical 
products. We also find the existence of interdependencies in pricing may have a 
further indirect effect of such regulation on launch times. Firm economies of scale, 
the therapeutic importance of specific product innovations and market size are found 
to counter the delaying impact of price and reimbursement regulation on new 
medicines adoption.  
 
Keywords: pharmaceutical innovation, medicines adoption, regulation, duration 
analysis 
JEL: I18 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
The vast majority of the wealthy countries, as defined through membership of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), employ pricing 
and reimbursement (P&R) controls on pharmaceutical products to help contain health 
care costs and promote rational drug use. The entry of new pharmaceuticals products 
into a national market is directly affected by such country-specific regulations. The 
pursuit of such (static efficiency) policies might however conflict with dynamic 
efficiency objectives if price and reimbursement regulation deters the early adoption 
of innovative products. However, the empirical evidence regarding the impact of such 
regulation on the launch timing of pharmaceutical products is scarce. 
 
This paper empirically examines the launch times of new medicines accounting for 
the effects of regulation within an environment of product competition.  We address 
methodological shortcomings of previous studies (Danzon et al, 2005; Danzon and 
Esptein, 2008; Kyle 2006, 2007)  and provide additional evidence on product launch 
times using a different drug mix and a more up-to-date analysis period that takes into 
account the existence of price externalities. We only consider the launch time of the 
first indication of molecules in each market as we anticipate that these new 
indications face higher barriers and costs to market entry. Given that patent protection 
is granted for new chemical entities (NCEs), essentially molecule entities, rather than 
products themselves, we believe that these first molecule entities represent innovation 
best.  
 
Price negotiations for further products with similar NCEs are expected to be quicker 
due to familiarity with the molecule. This reliance on first molecule timings also 
avoids attenuation in standard errors due to potential correlation in errors for different 
indications of a given molecule-country pair. We use duration modelling to avoid 
information loss, while controlling explicitly for drug and firm level heterogeneity to 
avoid omitted variable bias. As well as adding to the small literature that has 
addressed similar questions, unlike previous research we also explore the effect of 
price linkages across individual markets as created by external reference pricing and 
parallel trade in the European Union, through a secondary analysis focussing on 
European markets alone. We do so by drawing on a unique dataset from the 
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Intercontinental Medical Services (IMS) that contains data from the main OECD 
markets during 1999-2008, a period during which important regulatory reforms have 
taken place. 
 
Several studies have addressed how regulation affects adoption of innovative products 
in different industries (Dewick and Miozzo, 2002; Jaffe and Stavins, 1995; Sanchez 
and Post, 1998; Gruber and Verboven, 2001; Snyder et al., 2003; Wallsten, 2005; 
Sheppard et al., 2006). Arguably the unique regulatory nature of the pharmaceutical 
market provides a strong test to assess how regulation affects adoption of innovative 
products.  In this sector products are initially subject to regulation with regards to 
their safety and subsequently with regards to their efficacy, where their clinical effects 
are assessed with respect to a placebo or the existing standard therapy. Finally, after 
marketing approval has been granted and given that most new pharmaceuticals are 
purchased by health insurers or other third party payers, (such as government funded 
health service providers), products may also be subject to price and reimbursement 
regulation based on product characteristics such as their similarity to existing product 
treatment effects and/or a judgment of their value for money in providing additional 
clinical benefit over existing products. 
 
Such pricing and reimbursement regulation generally assumes that the costly R&D 
outlays spent on the development of new products be treated as a sunk cost.  These 
R&D investments can be substantial and have been estimated to be of the order of 
$800 million per new marketed product, with a range of $500 million to $2,000 
million depending on the therapy or the developing firm (Adams and Brantner, 2006; 
Dimasi et al., 2003; Dimasi, 2002). Individual firms are granted patent protection 
providing a means of appropriating returns to R&D activity, and the associated sunk 
costs, through the creation of time-limited monopoly rights to suppliers. Generally, 
and specifically for the countries analysed in this study, patent protection is for 20-
years, although this time is eroded in various ways – for example through the varying 
length of clinical trials to establish product quality, safety and efficacy and the rigour 
of the country specific reimbursement process. 
 
Note also that these are not full monopoly rights as patent protection is defined over 
new chemical entities (NCEs), essentially molecule based compounds, not individual 
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products. Patent protection may be given to numerous similar NCEs, which may 
result in the establishment of highly substitutable products within a market; all of 
which may be considered to be of some innovative quality but nevertheless belong to 
the same therapeutic class of pharmaceutical. 
 
The average time for granting of marketing approval over the period 1999-2003, 
according to the UK’s Pharmaceutical Industry Competitive Task Force, was 13.7 
months. Following marketing approval pricing and reimbursement regulation, based 
on formal guidance and accompanying negotiation begins. Given the global nature of 
the industry and the inter-relatedness of individual country markets, individual firms 
are conscious of the timing of launch across individual markets. Firms are particularly 
aware that smaller markets often price-reference to larger markets, thus establishment 
of appropriate price and reimbursement in any given market often impacts on the 
price obtained elsewhere. Moreover price differentials across countries, especially 
within the EU, may lead to so-called parallel imports, where cheaper drugs are 
imported into higher priced markets. Price and reimbursement regulation therefore 
affects product launch timings directly, but also indirectly through the resulting firm 
strategies used to maximise global sales in major markets. If firms can maximise price 
in any given market, then subsequent launches in other reference markets can build on 
this price.  
 
It is in this environment that individual firm decisions regarding launch strategies are 
taken, aimed at ensuring revenue streams to generate a return on R&D investments, 
but cognisant of the interaction of global prices. Pricing and reimbursement 
regulations aimed at containing firms’ monopoly rents, have the subsequent effect of 
delaying adoption of pharmaceutical innovation. It is important to recognise that these 
timing issues may have significant welfare impact, as delay to innovative medicines 
prevents access to potentially beneficial products, which can have detrimental 
population health effects.  
 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses prior evidence from 
the existing literature; Section 3 describes the methods; Section 4 presents the 
empirical results, and finally Section 5 discusses our main findings. 
 6 
 
2  BACKGROUND 
Thus pharmaceutical products typically face a number of regulatory hurdles; evidence 
on the quality, safety and efficacy of new molecules is estimated to take around ten-
years of pre-clinical and clinical research time (Permanand, 2006). Following review 
of the new product dossier by a regulatory authority such as the Food and Drug 
Authority (FDA) in the USA or the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in the EC, 
marketing authority is established, which defines the relevant patient population and 
therapeutic use. 
 
Lags in the adoption of innovative pharmaceutical products are then the result of 
different influences in different countries, but of great importance are local price and 
reimbursement regulations. Several studies in the literature have addressed delays 
attributable to drug review processes generally (Dranove and Meltzer, 1994; Thomas 
et al., 1998; Carpenter et al., 2003; Carpenter and Turenne, 2004; Bolten and 
Degregorio, 2002), while more recent studies have emphasized price controls and 
variations in reimbursement schemes ( see for example Danzon and Epstein, 2008; 
Lanjouw, 2005).  
 
These latter studies defined price and reimbursement controls in two basic ways. The 
first way, as used by Lanjouw (2005) uses treatment dummies to identify the presence 
of price controls exist at the time of launch. Similalrly, Mejer et al. (2007) use 
dichotomous variable approach to identify both direct price regulations (international 
price comparisons, therapeutic value/cost-effectiveness, pharmaceutical contribution 
to the economy) and indirect price regulations (profit control, reference pricing). The 
latter is used in a discrete choice analysis to test how different pricing and 
reimbursement schemes affect the probability of launch for NCEs approved by the 
centralized EMA procedure within the former EU15 during 1995-2004. Kyle (2007) 
estimates a discrete-time survival model using data in 28 countries over 1980-2000 
using a ranking of price bands and regulation dummies to indicate whether 
prescription budgets, reference pricing, price freezes and controls affect launch times. 
Studies using this first definition identify a significant effect of price controls on the 
 7 
probability of launch. Countries with the highest probability of launch impose the 
lowest regulation on prices and indirect price controls do not affect launch delays 
significantly for on-patent drugs (Heuer et al., 2007). Kyle (2007) further observes 
that launch in a price-controlled country significantly reduces the likelihood of 
introducing products in additional markets. 
 
Treatment dummies and price ranking, control for regulation only approximately and 
are potentially inaccurate given the dynamic and multidimensional nature of 
regulation. Price ranking, for example, may be highly heterogeneous with respect to 
therapeutic subgroups or across time. In addition, treatment dummies frequently 
exhibit multicollinearity with country effects. Partly in reaction to these criticisms, 
there is a newer, preliminary body of literature which has incorporated product-
specific data on actual prices to identify the impact of regulation empirically. 
 
These newer studies differ broadly in how they define product prices, and tend to 
emphasise the formulation of firm’s expectations over how price and reimbursement 
controls will affect price on entry. Danzon et al (2005) proxy expected price by the 
lagged average price per standard unit (SU)1  for the therapeutic class (ATC3) in 
quarters 3 and 4 prior to the first global launch, in an attempt to capture a firm’s 
expectation over the impact of price controls. While Danzon and Esptein (2008)  use 
the average competitor prices in the therapeutic class (at the finer ATC4 level) prior 
to local launch as a measure of this expectation. In terms of specification Danzon et 
al. (2005) use the continuous time Cox proportional hazard (PH) model whereas the 
latter study uses discrete-time implementation of the PH model by complementary 
log-log regression. Findings from the second category of studies, which use explicit 
definitions of expected product price, suggest that the hazard of launch is positively 
related to expected price, once again implying that price controls have a negative 
impact on launch timings. 
 
In addition to regulatory market barriers, late entry may reflect strategic firm 
behaviour to avoid the effects of price spillovers due to reference pricing and parallel 
trade. Danzon et al (2005) proxy such spillover effects through overall, market size, 
                                                 
1 IMS standard unit (SU) is the smallest dose for each form, for example, one tablet, one capsule, or 5 ml of liquid 
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identifying a significant market size effect. Whereas Danzon and Epstein (2008) 
conclude total volume of drugs in a therapeutic subgroup is not a significant factor 
affecting launch time. 
 
We utilise the approach of these later studies to be more explicit in analysing 
pharmaceutical product launch times and price spillovers in a large set of newly 
marketed molecules, and across a wider set of global launches than previously 
considered.  
  
3  METHODS 
3.1  Data 
Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS) data are used with quarterly sales data, in 
US$, over the period 1999 (Q1) – 2008 (Q3). The data used relates to standard unit 
(SU) sales of new molecules in 13 different ATC1 therapeutic categories during 1999 
Q1 – 2008 Q3.2 The dataset comprises 20 countries, which represent the major 
pharmaceutical markets in the OECD (plus South Africa)3. Each product is identified 
by the molecule name, IMS generic classification, global and local launch dates, 
therapeutic class (ATC4)4, and breakdown of sales by the distribution channel (retail 
versus hospital). Spain, Turkey, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Spain, South Africa have 
only retail channel data5; in Sweden retail and hospital sales are combined.  
 
The global launch date of a given molecule defines the onset of risk for subsequent 
launches in other markets. The launch dates are recorded monthly. The unit of 
analysis is molecule-country pairs. The time to launch for each molecule j-country k 
pair is defined as the difference between the global launch date of molecule j and the 
local launch date of molecule j in country k. The dataset is expanded to define 
                                                 
2 ATC1 therapeutic category is the Anatomical Therapeutic Category classification code for 
pharmaceuticals. Each ATC category stands for a pharmaceutical substance use in a single indication 
within 13 general categories of use. Finer classifications exist through five levels; ATC1 – ATC 5. 
3 The country set in alphabetical order is: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the UK and US 
4 We are happy to release the name of each group and product upon request.  
5 Launch in these countries therefore represents launch in the retail sector.  
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monthly time intervals following the global launch date until the local failure (launch 
or censoring) to account for the interval-censored nature of the launch timing data. 
Our empirical strategy takes advantage of the variation in launch dates which is 
attributable to the various expectations held by producers over the price and sales 
volume attainable in individual markets, the regulatory rules, and the degree of 
market competition.  
 
The molecule set is restricted to molecules that have launched in at least ten markets, 
which is a more stringent measure of global importance compared to prior studies. 
Prior studies at best consider either molecules that have launched in the US or UK, 
and our analysis is more complete in this respect. Our sample contains molecules that 
launched after 1999, and the total number of molecules in this set is 22,397, with the 
median time to launch being 14 months. 
 
The analysis uses ex-manufacturer price levels, that is any marketing discounts and 
mark-ups across the wholesaler and retailer sectors are ignored and we focus on the 
regulated price.  The price for all molecules is calculated by dividing the ex-
manufacturer total revenue by volume in SU sales. In Spain, Turkey, Belgium, 
Greece, Portugal, and South Africa generic launch is always within the pharmacy 
distribution chain. In Sweden launch could be either in the pharmacy or in hospital. 
For all remaining markets, IMS data includes retail prescription, pharmacy and 
hospital data. Obviously, given the range of discounts and co-payments that apply 
across these different sectors our calculated price will only ever proxy the true selling 
prices, but the ex-manufacturing price is the price at which national price regulations 
are negotiated. Moreover, estimated country fixed effects should account for some of 
the variation in country specific discounts. Quarterly average price is assumed for 
each month in a given quarter, and the price calculated essentially estimates a volume 
weighted average price for each molecule across all products with the same active 
ingredient.  
 
Further (confounding) variables are defined using the IMS data on sales, including an 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of global market competition, firm size as proxied by 
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sales volume, and product quality as established by molecule characteristics. OECD 
statistical extracts were obtained for additional data on GDP per capita6. Sales data 
was deflated using GDP deflators from the International Monetary Fund World 
Economic Outlook Database 20087,8. A list of descriptive statistics is provided in 
Table 1, with the appropriate log values were used in the model described below.  
 
3.2  Model 
Entry of a product into a given country, relative to the initial global entry, is treated as 
a binary outcome.  By attaching dates to this binary-outcome (launch) event, we can 
define whether or not launch in a given market has occurred during any given time 
interval and condition this on a number of factors, including the expected product 
price as determined by the regulatory environment, the degree of product competition 
and product quality. We use the timing of entry to estimate the conditional probability 
of launch during interval t, (i.e. in standard survival terms, this is the interval hazard 
rate).  
 
We use a complementary log-log (cloglog) function to estimate the time to launch. 
The cloglog transformation is a discrete-time implementation of the Cox proportional 
hazard (PH) model that assumes continuous time lapse to a pre-defined event, in our 
case launch date. It is typically used when time to an event is measured continuously, 
but grouped on a discrete time scale (e.g. months, as in this study) and when data are 
highly skewed (as is the case with launch times).  
 
The formal model is specified as: 
 ( )jkt tF γ+zβ = { }1 exp exp( )jkt tγ− − +zβ  
where F(.) is the cumulative binomial distribution function of launch times, which is a 
function of explanatory variables z, each indexed by molecule (j), country (k) and 
monthly time-period (t), and tγ  is a duration dependence (time effect) parameter 
                                                 
6 Available at http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx 
7 Observations with negative sales representing products returned to the manufacturer after withdrawal 
from the market, and which accounted for about 5% of the total number of observations, were dropped.   
8 Real sales figures were calculated as: Real Sales = Nominal Sales*100/GDP deflator 
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measuring the extent that probability of launch occurring is increasing (or decreasing) 
over time. This specification is associated with the launch rate (i.e the hazard rate) 
within any given month (t) as: 
  ( ) ( )( )tjktjk th γ+−−= βzexpexp1  or tjktjkth γ+= βz)(cloglog . 
 
The duration dependence parameter, tγ , assumes a crucial role in determining the 
probability of launch. Our empirical strategy specifies two different duration 
specifications for this parameter: (i) a parametric specification where , with t 
corresponding to the number of months passed since potential launch date (i.e. first 
global molecule adoption); specifically we assume duration dependence is modelled 
by the number of months passed since potential launch date plus a quadratic term, 
)ln( 2tt + , and (ii) a semi-parametric specification that includes dummies for each 
month following the possibility of potential  launch. Essentially the semi-parametric 
specification provides a robustness check of any potential bias arising from duration 
dependence being incorrectly specified9. 
 
Within the matrix of explanatory variables, z, we explicitly consider molecule launch 
times are conditioned on expected prices as a reflection of regulatory impact, market 
competition, market size and molecule and firm characteristics. We now detail each 
of these aspects individually10. The net effect of regulation is defined by expected 
launch prices, given that we note above that static treatment dummies would not 
capture the complexity in pricing mechanisms and the variation over time, across 
therapeutic categories, firms and countries. Expected prices are calculated as the 
average non-generic competitor prices in the same ATC4 lagged by one quarter. 
Generic products are excluded from average price calculations since inclusions of 
generics in expected price calculation would underestimate expected prices in 
countries with loose price regulation but strong generic penetration and would result 
in imprecise coefficient estimates. 
                                                 
9 We allow duration dependence parameters to be flexible and not directly account for unobserved 
heterogeneity (see Backer and Melino, 2000). 
10 The impact of one unit change in price (p) on probability of launch (h) is computed as  
dh/dp = (dh/d ln(p))·(d ln(p)/dp) = (dh/d ln(p))·(1/p) which equals (the marginal effect) · (1/p). Similarly, 
the impact of one standard deviation in price on the hazard of launch is estimated as (std 
dev)·(Marginal Effect from Regression)·(1/p) 
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The expected market size for a new molecule, reflecting both the importance of the 
market and the potential spillover effects, is defined as quarterly lagged total SU sales 
within the molecule’s ATC4 in individual markets. The ATC4 classification is used to 
define the potential market as competition and substitution effects are assumed 
strongest at this level11. 
 
Competition, proxied by a calculated Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ( HHI ), is also 
assumed to exert influence on the likelihood of launch. . The index, HHI , is defined 
as ( )∑
=
=
N
i
iHH sI
1
2 , where is is the market share of molecule i  and N is the number of 
molecules in the therapeutic subgroup ATC4. 
The competition effect, as measured by the concentration index, is ambiguous. High 
concentration is held to reduce the equilibrium level of entry in most industries. No 
prior study has tested this in the pharmaceutical sector by specifically considering the 
impact of concentration on the hazard of launch at a molecule subgroup level of 
analysis. High concentration among patent protected products within a molecule sub-
group might reflect a barrier to entry, and subsequent longer than expected launch 
dates for new products. However, note that patent protection is for the NCE, not the 
product per se and firms may compete in this patent protected market through 
emphasis on product quality and product characteristics. Moreover, as the production 
process for new prescription drugs occurs over a long development period with high 
sunk development costs and low distribution costs once a molecule is developed 
(DiMassi et al 2003), it is expected that companies would wish to launch as quickly as 
possible (Danzon and Epstein, 2008). Indeed the evidence on the effect of 
competition in the patent-protected markets suggests that competition incentivises 
entry (Kyle 2007).  
Firm effects play a key role in the strategic entry decisions within the pharmaceutical 
sector (Kyle, 2006; Kyle, 2007; Scott Morton, 1999). Large-firm advantage in 
pharmaceutical regulation has been suggested due to familiarity of the regulator with 
large firms with whom they have frequent dealings (Carpenter and Turenne, 2004).  
Similarly, scale effects suggest an advantage in promotional activities that may 
                                                 
11 When molecule -country fixed effects where specified we did not find a significantly different effect 
in the price coefficient.  
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influence physician-prescribing levels. Economies of scope imply knowledge 
spillovers across different drugs and markets. Learning effects through multiple 
launches in a given market can enable firms to effect more efficient launch strategies. 
Larger firms may therefore have better prospects of entry in any given market. 
Therapeutic quality is the main factor that defines product differentiation and strategic 
positioning of a new pharmaceutical technology, yet one cannot assume that all 
products are cost-effective and hence conductive to better quality of care. However, 
the therapeutic importance of molecules is found to affect the timing of P&R 
decisions as it is a key criterion in many countries. Products that offer therapeutic 
novelty or public health advantages with significant implications for health budgets 
may be eligible for a fast track approval and receive a price mark-up compared to 
existing products. The level of a molecule’s global sales in 2007 is used as a proxy to 
control for molecule characteristics since therapeutic importance and commercial 
success are highly positively correlated. 
 
4  RESULTS 
Table 2 presents base case estimates of the marginal effects gained from the cloglog 
specification for molecules that first launched globally after 1993. The results are 
presented both with respect to the quadratic duration specification with a second-order 
polynomial in time since global launch, and a semi-parametric specification as 
described above. Tests for the proportional hazard assumption are supportive 
(p>0.20). 
Our main result focus on the impact of price regulation on the timing of the launch of 
a new molecule is significant and strongly robust across these specifications. In all 
regression specifications the estimates for our measure of the impact of price 
regulation, the expected price, after controlling for volume are highly significant (p= 
0.001). A unit increase in the log expected launch price and the log of expected 
market size increases the probability of launch by 0.003 and 0.002 respectively (see 
Table 2). This is close in value to 0.0053, the marginal effect of expected price for 
superior molecules reported in Danzon and Epstein (2008). Standard error estimates 
of expected price are slightly lower because we cluster by molecule-country rather 
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than by molecule alone. The latter is expected given the presence of price (regulation) 
benchmarking across countries with are specific for each molecule.  
 
With respect to other effects, for competition, a unit increase in the log of HHI  
reduces the hazard rate by 0.005 in the quadratic specification and by 0.004 in the 
semi-parametric one, which implies the more competitive the subgroup, the higher is 
the likelihood of quick launch. In other words, and in common with many other 
industries, the higher the concentration, the lower is the likelihood of rapid launch. 
Firm heterogeneity, proxied by the number of countries12 a firm has launched in, is 
found to be highly significant; a unit increase in the log number of countries a firm 
has launched in (equivalent to multiplying geographical reach by 2.72) reduces the 
probability of delay by 0.011. This is close to the 0.009 estimate of Kyle (2007). With 
respect to molecule characteristics, a unit increase in the log molecule sales globally 
increases the hazard of launch by 0.004. The extent of global reach, as expected, was 
found to have a significantly positive effect on the probability of launch with a 
marginal effect of 0.059. The only caveat of our approach is that it might introduce a 
bias for older molecules as they have had more observed time to launch to more 
market, although we do control for time since first global launch. The effect of 
country income, as given by log GDP per capita ($) is positive but not significant, and 
is therefore excluded from some specifications.  
 
Finally, time may affect regression estimates in several ways. First, macroeconomic 
trends in the sector may have an impact on price levels, so we account for this by 
including dummies for each calendar year in all regressions. Second, time captures 
information about the relative innovativeness of new molecules. When a new 
molecule is about to launch, it represents incremental (or breakthrough) innovation 
compared to the molecules in its therapeutic subclass. The longer the time lapse from 
global launch, the higher is the probability that new competitors will enter to compete 
against the molecule lowering its comparative therapeutic advantage. The impact of 
time elapsed since first global launch is therefore captured by interacting expected 
                                                 12 The number of countries a product has launched is a proxy of quality in the sense that the treatment has managed to go through the recommendations of professional societies of different countries. However, it could well be due to differences in gaps in knowledge, yet other controls do measure such effects.   
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price, as well as volume with the time since global launch. A dummy variable (First 
Launch Before 1999) is also included to test if the hazard of launch is statistically 
different for molecules that launched globally after 1999 compared to the ones that 
launched first globally during [1993, 1999). Remember that the set of molecules was 
restricted to the ones that first launched after the establishment of the EU in 1993 and 
that all the failures, (i.e. local launches), are post-1999. Therefore, molecules with 
first global launch pre-1999 are left-truncated. Left-truncation is dealt with by 
omitting the subject from all binary outcome analyses during the truncation period 
since the subject could not have failed during that period (Cleves et al., 2008). 
Time interactions of price and volume are significantly negative, which suggests that 
the impact of price and volume decays over time following the global launch of the 
molecule.  Molecules that launched first before 1999 have a significantly lower 
hazard rate compared to molecules that launched after 1999; the marginal effect is in 
the range of -0.018 to -0.014 depending on the precise model specification (see Table 
2).  
 
Parameter estimates of t and t2 suggest concave duration dependence, while the 
hazard of launch initially increases and then decreases, which is in contrast to prior 
findings of Danzon and Epstein (2008) who observed that hazards first decrease then 
increase with time since global launch. This might be because the molecules in this 
analysis are more recent, and hence potentially more innovative, and have a higher 
extent of global reach overall (all molecules have launched in at least 10 markets). 
 
Given that we use proxies for a number of our confounding variables, we carry out a 
number of robustness checks. With respect to competition effects we carry out 
robustness checks by controlling for the number of substitute molecules and 
investigate whether generic competition is significant (fully reported as Appendix 
Table 1). We consider only quadratic duration specification for robustness checks as 
base case estimates suggest the fit of quadratic and semi-parametric specifications are 
comparable. Intermolecular competition is found to be more influential on the 
decision of entry, as compared to the extent of generic competition proxied by the 
number of substitute molecules with generic competition. This is consistent with 
findings of Kyle (2007) the number of competitor molecules in the same ATC4 
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significantly increases the hazard of launch, while the number of molecules with 
generic competition has no significant effect on the launch decision of new molecules.   
robustness checks were carried out by controlling for log firm sales in 2007, total and 
local numbers of firm molecules firms have launched to control for economies of 
scope (fully reported in Appendix Table 2). All scale and scope variables are robustly 
positive and significant. Portfolio diversity (number of prior molecules launched) is 
associated with quicker launch, which is in contrast to findings of Kyle (2007). We 
find no evidence of advantage through domestic launch. 
 
In the robustness checks, on molecule characteristics we further proxied therapeutic 
importance using the total number of markets in which a molecule has launched, i.e. 
global extent of launch (fully reported in Appendix Table 3). 
Finally, we also wish to explicitly test for the potential impact of price 
interdependency across country markets. We therefore restricted the country set to EU 
countries to assess this impact and report the results in  Table 3. We find strong 
evidence that external reference pricing slows adoption of innovation. Launch in a 
high-priced EU market increases the conditional probability of launch by 0.042 
compared to launch in a lower priced EU-market for molecules. This effect increases 
to 0.051 for molecules that first launched after 1999, suggesting an increase in the 
strategic importance of price in the timing of entry.  
 
From a strategic perspective, firms may risk the loss of competitive innovative edge 
as delays increase the chance of facing further competition later in time (Kyle and 
National Bureau of Economic, 2007). This suggests a second firm strategy, which 
involves pursuing convergence of prices in the EU market following launch to avoid 
knock-on effects due to parallel trade and external referencing, even if at the expense 
of foregoing some short-term local profits in some markets. We test for this strategy, 
by controlling for the extent of deviation between expected local price and the 
average EU price for the launching molecule (Table 4). The absolute difference 
between the local expected price and average EU price significantly decreases the 
hazard of launch; the sign of this difference remains insignificant. Launch and pricing 
strategies are multi-market optimization decisions; the trend to drive prices closer 
across different geographies may potentially reduce global prices.  
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Thus to summarise, regardless of the precise time duration specification, and 
controlling for a large number of confounding effects, price regulatory controls on 
reimbursement have a strong effect on time to launch. Across a range of 
specifications and definitions, we also find weak competition increases time-to-entry, 
while larger market size, higher therapeutic importance and the greater the number of 
markets a firm operates in reduces time-to-entry. We further find that within the 
confines of the EC market where, although individual countries have their own price 
and reimbursement authorities there is considerable cross-referencing of 
pharmaceutical prices and parallel importing of pharmaceutical products, price 
regulatory spillover effects appear to have an impact on launch times. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONLCUDING REMARKS 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on the effects of regulation on 
the launch of new medicines. First, through exploiting the variation both over time 
and molecule-country pairs in a larger set of launch countries and taking advantage of 
a richer set of variables than previous research. We also perform subsample analysis 
on a sample of European Union countries to capture the potential effect of price 
spillovers when price benchmarking is in place. We have estimated different duration 
specifications and used alternative proxies for risk factors to assess the robustness of 
the results. The dataset is thus the most comprehensive and up-to-date than 
comparable empirical studies in the literature, and contains more extensive controls, 
both in terms of control variables and the time period analysed. The analysis also 
makes use of firm and molecule heterogeneity that could bias estimates of the impact 
of price regulation if omitted. Finally, the analysis is carried out for potentially global 
molecules in this set of countries ensuring findings are relevant for a sample of 
innovative products and not restricted to an average sample of drugs that might 
include products of lesser therapeutic value, thus biasing the analysis of product 
launch times.  
Our results suggest a statistically significant and robust effect of price and 
reimbursement regulation on launch delay, as analysed through the expected price 
firms believe they will achieve in different jurisdictions.  Furthermore, given that 
external reference pricing regulations create price linkages across markets, we 
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conclude that regulation might also indirectly result in delayed access to 
pharmaceutical innovation through that mechanism.  Consistent with earlier evidence, 
we also find that greater concentration leads to longer launch times, which confirms 
the importance of policies directed at fostering competition in the pharmaceutical 
sector. We finally observe a significant and robust market size effect that decreases 
the launch time of new pharmaceutical products as market size increases.  
 
Nonetheless, we observe significant firm and molecule heterogeneity in the speed of 
launch. In particular, firm economies of scale and a molecule’s therapeutic 
importance grant substantial advantages for launch times internationally. Contrary to 
findings in the literature, we find no significant advantage to domestic launch.  
Findings in this paper suggest several policy implications. First, price regulations 
appear to result in a decrease in timely pharmaceutical adoption on a global scale, 
especially if there are price interdependencies. This  may impose welfare losses, 
particularly when the innovations that are delayed are cost-effective therapies from a 
societal perspective. From a public health perspective, lack of access to new drugs 
may lead to compromises in health outcomes (Schoffski, 2002), shift volume to older 
molecules of lower therapeutic value (Danzon and Ketcham, 2004) and compromise 
the quality of health care (Kessler, 2004; Wertheimer and Santella, 2004). Innovative 
medications offer economic benefits by avoiding expenditures on other forms of 
medical care (such as hospitalization) as well as reducing missed work days (Hassett, 
2004; Lichtenberg, 1996; Lichtenberg, 2003; Lichtenberg, 2005). 
 
Delays in adoption also reduce the net present value of R&D investments by delaying 
cash flows and shortening the exclusivity period, which could reduce future R&D and 
innovation (Giaccotto et al., 2005). Although price controls may therefore increase 
static efficiency in the short term by driving prices and marginal costs closer, they 
could also result in potential longer-term losses in dynamic efficiency due to the 
reduced incentives associated with market entry.  This study therefore highlights the 
importance of ensuring price and reimbursement regulation is efficient in this sector, 
not least as the regulation itself can have important spillover effects across countries. 
Our analysis also confirms greater concentration leads to longer launch times. To the 
extent that extensive price controls may reduce incentives to entry, they may play a 
further role in delaying pharmaceutical product market launch. Finally, due to scale 
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advantages in international rollout strategies, price controls may have helped increase 
the incentives for mergers and acquisitions, further increasing concentration levels 
and barriers to entry (LaMattina, 2011).  
 
From a policy perspective, the results are suggestive that price regulation does exert 
an influence on the company’s timing decision in entering a market.  However, our 
results rely on official data that do not contain potential rebates. Such rebates might 
be an important strategic tool used by manufacturer companies to manage and 
promote the diffusion of its product, while at the same time keeping the official price 
high. Such a strategy is of importance when price regulation spillovers exist through 
price benchmarking. While a limitation of this study, it is a general data limitation 
given the lack of source material on discounts in this sector. 
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TABLES  
Table 1 Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for the Data used in Survival 
Analysis 
External 
Environment  
Variable Name  
Regulatory Environment Mean Std Dev 
Expected Price  Average Price per SU of non-generic 
products in the therapeutic class 
(defined at country-ATC4 level)a  
$42.9 $174.9 
Relative Price Relative  Price to the highest in the 
EUb 
0.29 0.46 
Price Setting  External Referencing (Binary 
variable indicating whether external 
reference pricing is applied; defined 
at country level) 
0.83 0.37 
Expected 
Market Size 
Total Sales in SU (lagged 1-year) in 
the therapeutic class (defined at 
country-ATC4 level) 
24,736,0
00 
96,220,
000 
GDP per capita GDP per capita ($) $26,804 $8,080 
Market 
Concentration 
Log Molecule Concentration 
( )∑
=
=
N
i
iHH sI
1
2 , where is is the 
market share of molecule i  and N is 
the number of molecules in the 
therapeutic subgroup (defined at 
country-ATC4 level) 
10.058 1.158 
Intermolecular 
Competition 
Number of Molecules in the 
therapeutic class (defined at country-
ATC4 level) 
9.89 15.94 
Generic 
Competition 
No. of Molecules with Generic 
Competition in the therapeutic class 
(defined at country-ATC4 level) 
7.85 16.25 
Economies of 
Scope 
Global Firm Sales ($) in 2007 $14.1mill
ion 
$12.9m
illion 
 Number of Countries Firm has 
Launched in 
16 7 
Economies of Firm's Total Number of Molecules 453.5 401 
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Scale 
 Local Firm Experience (number of 
molecules launched) 
112 121.5 
Location of 
Firm 
Headquarters 
Domestic Launch 0.11 0.31 
Therapeutic/Co
mmercial 
Importance 
Global Molecule Sales ($) in 2007 $357,758 $766,5
66 
 Molecule's Global Reach (total 
markets launched in) 
15 3 
Period of 
Global Launch 
(old vs new) 
First Global Launch Before 1999 0.67 0.47 
Note: a All lags are by one quarter.b We defined this variable as a binary variable as based on Kyle (2007) 
(1 if high priced; 0 otherwise).  
 
Table 2 Marginal Effects for Base Case Regression Results 
 
Molecules with Global Launch post-1993 
Marginal Effects in Cloglog 
(quadratic in t) 
Marginal Effects in 
Cloglog (semi-
parametric) 
1 2 1 2 
Log Lagged Average Non-Generic 
Price/SU in Ctry-ATC4  
0.003*** 
[0.0007] 
0.003*** 
[0.0007] 
0.003*** 
[0.0006] 
0.003*** 
[0.0007] 
Log Lagged Total SU in Ctry-ATC4  
0.002*** 
[0.0005] 
0.002*** 
[0.0005] 
0.002*** 
[0.0005] 
0.002*** 
[0.0005] 
Log GDP per capita 
 
 
0.017 
[0.0241] 
 
 
0.024 
[0.0240] 
Log Molecule Concentration in Ctry-
ATC4 (IHH)  
-0.005*** 
[0.0010] 
-0.005*** 
[0.0010] 
-
0.004*** 
[0.0010] 
-
0.004*** 
[0.0010] 
Log Number of Countries Firm has 
Launched in  
0.011*** 
[0.0019] 
0.011*** 
[0.0021] 
0.010*** 
[0.0018] 
0.011*** 
[0.0021] 
 Log Global Molecule Sales in 2007  
0.004*** 
[0.0005] 
0.004*** 
[0.0006] 
0.004*** 
[0.0005] 
0.004*** 
[0.0005] 
Log Lagged Average Non-Generic 
Price/SU in Ctry-ATC4*ln(t)  
-0.001** 
[0.0003] 
-0.001** 
[0.0003] 
-
0.001*** 
[0.0003] 
-
0.001*** 
[0.0003] 
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Log Lagged Total SU in Ctry-ATC4*ln(t) 
-0.001*** 
[0.0002] 
-0.001*** 
[0.0002] 
-
0.001*** 
[0.0002] 
-
0.001*** 
[0.0002] 
First global launch before 1999  
-0.018*** 
[0.0032] 
-0.020*** 
[0.0033] 
-
0.014*** 
[0.0031] 
-
0.016*** 
[0.0032] 
Years since global launch (t)  
0.012*** 
[0.0018] 
0.012*** 
[0.0019] 
 
 
 
 
Years since global launch squared (t2)  
-0.001*** 
[0.0002] 
-0.001*** 
[0.0002] 
 
 
 
 
Austria 
  
0.043*** 
[0.0096] 
0.043*** 
[0.0096] 
0.042*** 
[0.0093] 
0.042*** 
[0.0093] 
Belgium 
  
0.005 
[0.0056] 
0.005 
[0.0058] 
0.003 
[0.0052] 
0.003 
[0.0054] 
Canada 
  
0.01 
[0.0062] 
0.009 
[0.0062] 
0.009 
[0.0058] 
0.008 
[0.0059] 
Finland 
  
0.041*** 
[0.0094] 
0.044*** 
[0.0104] 
0.039*** 
[0.0091] 
0.043*** 
[0.0102] 
France 
  
0.001 
[0.0054] 
0.003 
[0.0062] 
0 
[0.0051] 
0.003 
[0.0060] 
Germany 
  
0.059*** 
[0.0121] 
0.062*** 
[0.0130] 
0.056*** 
[0.0116] 
0.060*** 
[0.0126] 
Greece 
  
0.014* 
[0.0065] 
0.021 
[0.0133] 
0.011 
[0.0060] 
0.022 
[0.0133] 
Italy 
  
0.006 
[0.0052] 
0.009 
[0.0067] 
0.005 
[0.0049] 
0.008 
[0.0064] 
Japan 
  
-0.017*** 
[0.0036] 
-0.016*** 
[0.0042] 
-
0.015*** 
[0.0035] 
-
0.014*** 
[0.0041] 
Netherlands 
  
0.075*** 
[0.0155] 
0.072*** 
[0.0156] 
0.072*** 
[0.0151] 
0.070*** 
[0.0151] 
Poland 
  
0.004 
[0.0053] 
0.024 
[0.0338] 
0.003 
[0.0049] 
0.033 
[0.0376] 
Portugal 
  
0.005 
[0.0068] 
0.015 
[0.0174] 
0.004 
[0.0062] 
0.018 
[0.0181] 
S.Africa 
  
0.003 
[0.0058] 
 
0.001 
[0.0053] 
 
Spain 
  
0.009 
[0.0062] 
0.014 
[0.0096] 
0.007 
[0.0058] 
0.014 
[0.0094] 
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Sweden 
  
0.057*** 
[0.0126] 
0.059*** 
[0.0128] 
0.057*** 
[0.0124] 
0.059*** 
[0.0126] 
Switzerland 
  
0.022** 
[0.0079] 
0.020* 
[0.0085] 
0.020** 
[0.0074] 
0.016* 
[0.0079] 
Turkey 
  
-0.005 
[0.0045] 
0.017 
[0.0386] 
-0.006 
[0.0042] 
0.029 
[0.0451] 
UK 
  
0.048*** 
[0.0101] 
0.049*** 
[0.0104] 
0.046*** 
[0.0099] 
0.048*** 
[0.0103] 
USA 
  
0.083*** 
[0.0205] 
0.074** 
[0.0234] 
0.081*** 
[0.0196] 
0.069** 
[0.0220] 
Calendar Year Dummies a yes yes yes Yes 
ATC1 Dummies yes yes yes Yes 
Post Global Launch Yearly Interval 
Dummies b 
no no yes Yes 
Number of observations 54594 51132 54594 51132 
Log Likelihood -10131.277 -9619.788 
-
10076.97
2 
-
9568.201 
Note:    *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001.  
 Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at country level 
                    a Dummies available upon request 
b For semi-parametric duration specification 
 
Table 3 Robustness Check: Regulation EU subsample 
Variables 
Marginal Effects 
 by Cloglog (quadratic in t) 
1 2 
3 
(post-99) 
Log Lagged Avg Price/SU  
0.004*** 
[0.0007] 
0.004*** 
[0.0007] 
0.005*** 
[0.0010] 
Log Lagged Total SU  
0.003*** 
[0.0005] 
0.003*** 
[0.0005] 
0.004*** 
[0.0007] 
External Referencing 
-0.030*** 
[0.008] 
 
 
 
 
High Price EU  
 
 
0.042*** 
[0.008] 
0.051*** 
[0.013] 
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Years since global launch (t)  
0.007*** 
[0.0015] 
0.007*** 
[0.0015] 
0.026*** 
[0.0032] 
Years since global launch 
squared (t2)   
-0.001*** 
[0.0002] 
-0.001*** 
[0.0002] 
-0.003*** 
[0.0006] 
Number of Obs 39189 39189 23767 
LogLikelihood -7420.85 -7420.85 -4899.87 
Note:    *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001.  Non-exponentiated parameter estimates 
reported . Country, ATC1 and calendar-year dummies included 
Table 4 EU Subsample: Test for Expected Price Deviations from the Average Price 
of the Launching Molecule 
 Variable 
Parameter Estimates by Cloglog  
(quadratic in t) 
1 2 
Log Lagged Avg Non-Generic Price/SU in Ctry-ATC4 
0.083*** 
[0.02] 
0.079*** 
[0.02] 
Log Lagged Total SU in Ctry-ATC4 
0.056*** 
[0.01] 
0.055*** 
[0.01] 
Absolute Difference btw Local Expected Price and 
Average EU Price ( ∆P = Local Expected Price – Average 
EU Price) 
-0.124* 
[0.06] 
-0.141** 
[0.04] 
Absolute ∆P * Sign(∆P) 
-0.031 
[0.07] 
 
 
Sign(∆P)  
 
 
-0.001 
[0.06] 
Years since global launch (t) 
0.106** 
[0.04] 
0.105** 
[0.04] 
Years since global launch squared (t2) 
-0.018*** 
[0.00] 
-0.018*** 
[0.00] 
Country Dummies Yes Yes 
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes 
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes 
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Number of Observations 27322 27322 
LogLikelihood -5624.5 -5624.58 
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Non-exponentiated parameter estimates reported . 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1 Robustness Check: Market Structure and Competition 
 Variables  
Marginal Effects in Cloglog (quadratic in t) 
1 2 3 4 
Log Lagged Avg Price/SU 
in ATC4 
0.003*** 
[0.0007] 
0.004*** 
[0.0009] 
0.003*** 
[0.0007] 
0.004*** 
[0.0007] 
Log Lagged Total SU in 
Ctry-ATC4  
0.002*** 
[0.0005] 
0.003*** 
[0.0006] 
0 
[0.0005] 
0.001 
[0.0005] 
Log Molecule 
Concentration in Ctry-atc4 
(IHH)  
-0.003** 
[0.0010] 
-0.002 
[0.0011] 
0.000001 
[0.0011] 
0.000001 
[0.0010] 
Log Number of Molecules 
with Generic Comp in 
Ctry-ATC4  
 
0.000001 
[0.0005] 
  
Log Number of Molecules 
in Ctry-ATC4  
  
0.012*** 
[0.0014] 
0.012*** 
[0.0014] 
Log Lagged Avg Price/SU 
* ln(t)  
   
-0.001** 
[0.0003] 
Log Lagged Total SU * 
ln(t)  
   
-0.001*** 
[0.0002] 
First Launch Before 1999     
-0.014*** 
[0.0034] 
Years since global launch 
(t)  
0.003** 
[0.0012] 
0.003** 
[0.0012] 
0.003** 
[0.0012] 
0.011*** 
[0.0018] 
Years since global launch 
squared (t2) 
-0.001*** 
[0.0001] 
-0.001*** 
[0.0001] 
-0.001*** 
[0.0001] 
-0.001*** 
[0.0002] 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 54721 38098 54721 54721 
LogLikelihood -10290.07 -6731.46 -10246.68 -10225.81 
 
Note:    *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001.  
 Non-exponentiated parameter estimates reported 
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      Table A.2 Robustness Check: Firm Effects 
Variables 
Marginal Effects in Cloglog (quadratic in t) 
1 2 3 4 
Log Lagged Avg Non-Generic 
Price/SU in Ctry-ATC4 
0.003*** 
[0.0006] 
0.003*** 
[0.0006] 
0.003*** 
[0.0006] 
0.003*** 
[0.0006] 
Log Lagged Total SU in Ctry-
ATC4 
0.003*** 
[0.0004] 
0.003*** 
[0.0004] 
0.002*** 
[0.0004] 
0.003*** 
[0.0004] 
Log Firm Sales (global) in 2007  
0.004*** 
[0.0005] 
 
 
 
 
0.005*** 
[0.0005] 
Log Number of Countries Firm has 
Launched in  
 
 
0.009*** 
[0.0017] 
 
 
 
 
Log Local Firm Experience 
(number of molecules launched) 
 
 
0.003*** 
[0.0006] 
 
 
 
 
Log Firm's Total Number of 
Molecules 
 
 
 
 
0.003*** 
[0.0006] 
 
 
Domestic Launch  
 
 
-0.002 
[0.0035] 
0.009 
[0.0047] 
Log Lagged Avg Non-Generic 
Price/SU in Ctry-ATC4 * ln(t)  
   
-0.001** 
[0.0003] 
Log Lagged Total SU in Ctry-
ATC4 * ln(t)  
   
-0.001*** 
[0.0002] 
First Launch Before 1999    
-0.013*** 
[0.0028] 
Years since global launch (t)  
0.005*** 
[0.0011] 
0.005*** 
[0.0011] 
0.004*** 
[0.0011] 
0.012*** 
[0.0017] 
Years since global launch squared 
(t2)  
-0.001*** 
[0.0001] 
-0.001*** 
[0.0001] 
-0.001*** 
[0.0001] 
-0.001*** 
[0.0001] 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 58521 58530 58530 58521 
LogLikelihood -10487.9 -10502.04 -10526.97 -10463.85 
Note:    *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Non-exponentiated parameter estimates reported 
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Table A.3 Robustness Check: Molecule Characteristics 
 
Marginal Effects in Cloglog (quadratic in t) 
1 2 4 
Log Lagged Price/SU  
0.0031*** 
[0.0006] 
0.003*** 
[0.0006] 
0.0031*** 
[0.0006] 
Log Lagged Total SU in Ctry-ATC4  
0.0022*** 
[0.0004] 
0.0020*** 
[0.0004] 
0.0020*** 
[0.0004] 
Log Global Molecule Sales  
0.0033*** 
[0.0005] 
 
 
 
 
Log Molecule's Global Reach  
 
 
0.0592*** 
[0.0059] 
0.0591*** 
[0.0058] 
Log Lagged Avg Price/SU * ln(t)  
 
 
 
 
-0.0012** 
[0.0003] 
Log Lagged Total SU * ln(t)  
 
 
 
 
-0.0013*** 
[0.0002] 
First Launch Before 1999  
 
 
 
 
-0.0103*** 
[0.0028] 
Years since global launch (t)  
0.0042*** 
[0.0011] 
0.0041*** 
[0.0011] 
0.011*** 
[0.0017] 
Years since global launch squared  
-0.0012*** 
[0.0001] 
-0.0012*** 
[0.0001] 
-0.001*** 
[0.0001] 
Number of Obs 58279 58530 58530 
LogLikelihood -10433 -10485 -10467 
Note:    *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001.    Non-exponentiated parameter estimates reported. 
Country, ATC1 and calendar-year dummies included 
 
 
 
